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What Does it Take to Reduce Massachusetts Emissions 50% by 2030?
Challenges Meeting Climate Goals Under Current Legislation (S.2500)
Lucy E Metz, Alice I Bell, Talia W Deady, and Alexander R Barron, Smith College
August 1st, 2020
Executive Summary: To do its part in the global fight against climate change, Massachusetts must
achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century, and aggressive intermediate goals are
essential to ensure that the state is on track for net zero. Senate bill 2500, “An Act setting next generation
climate policy,” stipulates that 2030 emissions must “not be less than 50% below the 1990 emissions
level.” In 2017, Massachusetts carbon dioxide emissions were 22% below 1990 levels, so the state will
need to reduce annual emissions by an additional 28% of 1990 levels by 2030. If enacted, S.2500 would
give the state important new tools that would significantly reduce emissions. However, our analysis
suggests that additional policies beyond those in S.2500 will likely be necessary to reliably achieve
the 2030 goal of cutting emissions in half from 1990 levels.
With no new policies enacted (but not accounting for COVID-19), we estimate that 2030 emissions will
be roughly 35% below 1990 levels (Figure 1, BAU). We use a range of policy proposals to approximate
the key policies in S.2500: the Transportation and Climate Initiative cap and invest program, a net zero
stretch building code, and a moderate carbon price ($29/MT rising to $48 in 2030—roughly similar to one
in a recent legislative proposal) in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. We use published
modeling results to approximate these policies and estimate that they would reduce emissions by an
additional 6% below 1990 levels (~41%). This leaves an emissions reductions shortfall of ~9% (or 8
million metric tons of CO2, roughly the equivalent of 1.7 million passenger vehicles) in 2030 (see Fig. 1).
To reach a 50% reduction by 2030, Massachusetts could implement a higher carbon price (e.g. $58/MT
rising to $95 by 2030), which would be possible under S.2500. Some (but not all) models suggest that a
higher carbon price alone would be sufficient to reach 50% of 1990 levels by 2030. Another option (not in
S.2500) is to enact an ambitious clean electricity standard to reduce electricity emissions. To ensure we
reach the 2030 goal, robust policies will be needed in all major sectors of the state's economy, with
electricity sector decarbonization particularly important (Fig. 1, Stringent case).

Figure 1: Projected MA emissions through
2030. The business-as-usual (BAU) case
includes existing policy only, key S.2500
policies estimates the effect of policies
added under the bill, and the stringent
policy case outlines a scenario in which MA
could achieve the 2030 goal from S.2500.
The vertical bars show the range of carbon
price projections from the models in our
data set. Although S.2500’s targets would
cover all greenhouse gases, our analysis
includes CO2 only.
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Background: Recently, Massachusetts has moved to pursue more aggressive climate goals. In 2008,
Massachusetts enacted the Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA), which set the state’s 2050
greenhouse gas emissions limit at 80% of 1990 levels. Based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s 2018 report, global emissions must reach net zero (emissions minus sinks like forest regrowth)
by mid-century in order to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and avoid the most
catastrophic effects of climate change (IPCC, 2018). The earlier goal of the GWSA is not consistent with
such rapid decarbonization, especially given that wealthier and more technologically advanced regions
like Massaachusetts will need to reach net zero sooner than mid-century for the global goal to be feasible.
In April, Governor Baker officially tightened the state’s target to net zero by 2050.
S.2500, “An Act setting next generation climate policy,” builds a framework to reach this ambitious goal
of net zero emissions by 2050, with intermediate goals every five years beginning in 2020—including a
target of 50% below 1990 levels by 2030.
To achieve these reduction goals, bill S.2500, among other measures:
● Establishes market-based compliance mechanisms—such as carbon taxes or cap and trade
systems—in the transportation, commercial, industrial, and residential sectors
● Mandates the creation of a net zero stretch energy code
● Institutes a Climate Policy Commission to monitor emissions progress
● Requires the Department of Public Utilities to consider greenhouse gas emissions in its
decision-making
S.2500 is part of a three-bill climate package that also includes S.2498, “An Act to accelerate the
transition of cars, trucks and buses to carbon-free power,” and S.2499, “An Act relative to energy savings
efficiency.” Of the three bills, S.2500 would have by far the largest impact on statewide emissions.1 The
Senate passed S.2500 in January 2020, and it was subsequently referred to the House Ways and Means
Committee (Bill S.2500, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic absorbed much of legislators’ attention in the
following months, but S.2500 was amended as H.4912 and passed by the House on July 31st. The two
bills will now go into conference. H.4912, “An Act creating a 2050 roadmap to a clean and thriving
commonwealth,” would also establish a 2050 deadline for net zero emissions, with an interim 2030 limit
that “shall be at least 50 percent below the 1990 level.” However, H.4912 leaves most specific policies to
be defined in the future (Bill H.4912, 2020).
A key question is whether the measures that the EEA (Executive Office of Energy and Environmental
Affairs) and other parts of the Massachusetts government are likely to undertake as a result of S.2500 will
be sufficient to meet the bill’s emissions targets, and specifically the 2030 target. Historically, the two
Massachusetts sectors with the highest emissions are transportation and electricity generation, but the
1

S.2498 would decarbonize the MBTA and conduct a study on the electrification of other state- and
municipally-owned vehicles. Importantly, this bill would reduce urban pollution (Cronin, 2020), a key
environmental justice concern. However, the MBTA only accounted for 0.25 MMT CO2e in 2016, less than 1% of
total MA transportation emissions (Lasker, 2017). S.2499 would update appliance standards for increased energy
and water efficiency (Cronin, 2020). Energy efficiency is central to building decarbonization, but this bill by itself
would not have a noticeable impact on statewide emissions.
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EEA’s freedom under S.2500 to design new emissions-reducing policies in these sectors may be limited.
In the transportation sector, there is the general expectation that reductions would be met through
participation in the multi-state Transportation and Climate Initiative. In the electricity sector, S.2500
relies on existing policies to reduce emissions and does not add new carbon pricing authority. While
electricity emissions are already covered under a carbon price through the multi-state Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative and by a Renewable Portfolio Standard and Clean Energy Standard, those
measures are not as aggressive as standards recently adopted in other states.2
While this paper focuses on the emissions reductions that are likely to occur as a result of S.2500, it is
worth noting that climate legislation is inextricably connected to social justice and equity considerations.
For example, carbon prices can be designed to benefit low-income households (Rosenberg, Toder & Lu,
2018). California’s carbon pricing policy explicitly invests a significant portion in, or for the benefit of,
disadvantaged communities (CalEPA, 2020). In addition, policies targeting carbon pollution also reduce
other pollutants, offering significant public health co-benefits (Karlsson, Alfredsson & Westling, 2020). A
Harvard study found that between 2017 and 2040, air pollution reductions from a modest carbon price in
Massachusetts could save 82–590 lives within the state (63%) and in surrounding areas (Buonocore et al.
2018). S.2500 would therefore offer immediate, tangible benefits to Massachusetts residents in addition to
helping avoid the worst longer-term effects of climate change.
Approach: Our analysis provides a rough quantitative assessment of whether the provisions in S.2500 are
likely to hit the bill’s 2030 target. We used publicly available data from prior modeling to estimate
Massachusetts emissions in the five major emissions-producing sectors (transportation, residential,
commercial, industrial, and electric power) under three cases. The business as usual (BAU) case only
includes the effects of existing policy. The S.2500 proxy case models the effects of policies added under
the bill, including a moderate carbon tax similar to other recent carbon tax proposals in the state. The
stringent policy case outlines a scenario in which MA could reliably achieve the 2030 goal from S.2500
through implementation of a more aggressive carbon price and an updated clean electricity standard. An
important caveat is that S.2500 covers all types of greenhouse gas emissions, including methane, but we
only consider carbon dioxide in our analysis, as it is the largest and most easily regulated source of
emissions.
To establish the BAU case, we used emissions data from the 2020 Annual Energy Outlook prepared by
the Energy Information Administration. For the transportation sector, we used Transportation and Climate
Initiative (TCI) modeling to determine BAU emissions (TCI, 2019b). We note that these projections
(which show a reduction to 35% below 1990 levels by 2030 across all sectors) pre-date the COVID-19
pandemic, which has significantly depressed emissions in the short term and may reduce them as far out
as 2030 (Larsen et al. 2020).3 Rather than run new models to project the impacts of S.2500, we used data
2

Maine’s RPS reaches 80% in 2030, New York 70% in 2030 (100% by 2040), and Vermont 75% in 2032 (NCSL,
2020). In contrast, the Massachusetts RPS is only 35% in 2030, and the CES (which expands upon the RPS) is 40%
(MassDEP, 2020).
3
Recent work by the Rhodium group suggests national emissions in 2030 may be as much as 12% lower depending
upon the pace of the recovery from COVID-19. However, we expect the emissions benefit in New England to be
much smaller. The significant reductions in Rhodium occur in electricity and transportation. Because coal
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from Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) Model Intercomparison Project 32 (2018) to examine the
effects of a carbon tax in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors (using national-level and
regional-level responses to approximate emissions reductions). To estimate the effects of carbon pricing
in the transportation sector, we again used projections from TCI. We also added a crude estimate of
potential savings from the net zero building stretch code.
S.2500 would significantly reduce emissions, but modeling suggests it would fall short of the 2030
target: In addition to previously existing measures, the S.2500 proxy case includes estimates of a modest
carbon price in the commercial, industrial, residential, and transportation sectors and a net zero building
stretch code. S.2500 does not include a new carbon price for the electric power sector, presumably
because it is already part of a regional cap and trade program (RGGI, the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative).
The most likely way that Massachusetts would implement a carbon price in the transportation sector as
part of S.2500 is through the Transportation and Climate Initiative (TCI), a collaboration of twelve
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states (plus DC) that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2019, TCI
released a draft proposal for a cap and invest plan which would set a cap for all on-road gasoline and
diesel emissions (TCI, 2019a). The cap would be reduced by 20–25% from 2022 to 2032, and proceeds
from allowance sales would be invested in green infrastructure projects. In the TCI reference case,
emissions in the Northeast are projected to decrease by 19% from 2022 to 2032, although they will
remain at a higher level if federal standards are relaxed. The cap and invest program would reduce
emissions an additional 1.5–5% below the reference case4 (Appendix C). Lower-post COVID-19 travel
could reduce the revenues from TCI and therefore the impact of these investments; at the same time, it is
possible that MA could reduce emissions more than the collaborative as a whole with strong state
policies.
In the commercial, industrial, and residential sectors, it is less certain what type of carbon price the EEA
would choose to implement. For our analysis, we assumed that the EEA would adopt carbon prices
similar to those in H.2810, a recent carbon tax bill with an explicit price trajectory.5 We represented the
carbon price in these sectors with a moderate tax that begins at $29 per metric ton (MT) CO2 (2019
dollars) and rises at 5% a year, reaching $48 per MT CO2 in 2030. Under S.2500, the carbon price in the
commercial and industrial sectors could be implemented as late as 2025, and in the residential sector as
late as 2030. To obtain an optimistic estimate of the bill’s effects, we assumed that both prices would
begin early in this decade (or, more precisely, that the impact in 2030 is the same as EMF modeling,
which assumed a start in 2020). The median reduction from this tax trajectory is 3.3 million metric tons
(MMT) CO2, but model estimates range from 0.5 to 8.9 MMT. (See Appendix B for more information.)

retirements have already largely occurred in New England, the bulk of the additional reductions in electricity will
occur in other parts of the US. Similarly, we assume that transportation emissions will be covered by a cap-and-trade
system under S.2500, which will have the same cap (with a lower allowance price) if BAU emissions turn out to be
lower post-COVID-19.
4
This estimate includes the effects of both the cap reduction and green investments (TCI, 2019b).
5
H.2810, filed in 2019, was a popular bill with 107 cosponsors in the Massachusetts House.
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S.2500 also mandates the development of a net zero stretch code. Massachusetts first implemented a
stretch code as part of the Green Communities Act in 2008. Towns elect to replace their base building
code with the more energy efficient stretch code in exchange for grant eligibility (GCD, 2019). Currently,
more than 80% of MA residents live in communities with the stretch code in place (DOER, 2019). A net
zero stretch code would require newly constructed buildings to be highly efficient, usually entailing
electrification, and to produce or purchase renewable energy to meet their remaining energy demand
(USGBC, 2019). By 2030, we very roughly estimate that the net zero code would reduce emissions on the
order of 0.5 MMT CO2 (Appendix D). Because of the slow turnover of building stock, much of the net
zero code’s effects would take place after 2030.
As shown in Figure 2, the policies in the S.2500 proxy case (with a moderate carbon price) would reduce
emissions by 41% of 1990 levels, well short of the 50% goal. Despite variation in the projected effect of
the carbon price, even the most optimistic estimate from the modeling data falls short of the 2030 goal
(full range 38–47% reduction, Figure 1). Accounting for COVID-19 might close the gap for the most
optimistic carbon price cases, but not reliably.

Figure 2: Reductions by policy in the S.2500 proxy case in 2030. Red bars show emissions in a given year, and
green bars show reductions by policy in 2030 from 2017 levels. The value of carbon tax reductions is the median
from the EMF models. The TCI reduction assumes that MA enacts a 25% cap reduction 2022–2032, which is the
most ambitious option in TCI’s current cap and invest proposal. Net zero stretch code estimate is only approximate.

An aggressive carbon price can reach the 2030 goal but not in most projections: Because S.2500
does not specify a price trajectory, the EEA could choose to institute a higher carbon price. We modeled
this possibility with an EMF tax trajectory that begins at $58/MT in 2020 and increases at 5% a year,
reaching $95 in 2030 ($2019). The median reduction from this policy is 5.2 MMT CO2 by 2030, but
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values range from 1.8 MMT to 10.7 MMT.6 Combined with existing policy, TCI, and the stretch code,
this results in overall reductions of 39–49% below 1990 levels. The stringent carbon tax reduces
emissions to within 1% of the goal only if one considers the most optimistic model result for each sector.
Under all other model combinations, the reductions still fall short of the goal. There is reason to believe
that economic models tend to underestimate the effectiveness of carbon pricing (Barron, 2018), and a
post-COVID-19 economy might also keep emissions lower than projections—even to the end of the
decade (Larsen et al. 2020). However, using the data currently available, it appears that policies would
need to be added to S.2500 or in subsequent legislation to reliably achieve the 2030 goal.
Hitting the 2030 goal requires further addressing emissions from electricity and/or transport:
Despite the shortfall in the S.2500 proxy case, reaching 50% of 1990 levels by 2030 is economically and
technically feasible in Massachusetts. Part of the challenge in the proxy case is that a framework relying
on existing policy in the electricity sector misses opportunities in the sector that many analysts agree is
easiest to decarbonize (UC Berkeley, 2020). Similarly, while the TCI program will help enable emissions
reductions of up to 24% in the transportation sector, this sector produces by far the largest share of CO2
emissions in the Commonwealth (45% in 2017, Appendix A).
One example of how Massachusetts could meet the 2030 goal while maintaining collaborations in
regional policy is by combining a stringent carbon price with a strengthened clean energy (i.e. electricity)
standard (CES) or renewable portfolio standard (RPS). Together, these policies bring Massachusetts
within range of the goal, as shown in Figure 3.7
Instituting a stronger CES or RPS would dramatically improve MA’s chances of meeting the 2030
emissions goal. Clean energy standards require that electric utilities provide a certain percentage of
electricity each year from low-carbon sources, including renewables, nuclear, and hydropower
(MassDEP, 2018). The current CES standard, enacted in 2017, expands upon the older RPS (renewable
portfolio standard) and reaches 40% by 2030 (MassDEP, 2020). Because municipal light boards and
municipal electric departments are exempted from the standard, the effective CES is only about 34% in
2030.8 Strengthening the CES is not part of S.2500, but language strengthening the RPS was included in
H.4912. Joe Biden announced that if he is elected as United States president, his climate plan would
include an Energy Efficiency and Clean Electricity Standard that would completely decarbonize the
power sector by 2035 (Biden, 2020)—although it would require sufficient votes in the U.S. Congress.
6

This is similar in magnitude to the results of the 2014 study performed by Breslow, Hamel, Lucknow, and
Nystrom, which is the only report to date that specifically analyzes carbon pricing in MA. Breslow et al. modeled
three economy-wide carbon tax trajectories, beginning at $11/MT CO2 in 2016 and reaching $43-$70/MT by 2030
($2019). They found that from the 2020s onward, a carbon tax would reduce emissions an additional 5-10% of 2013
levels below the BAU projection. In our analysis of 2030 emissions, TCI and a carbon tax in the commercial,
residential and industrial sectors reduce emissions by an additional 3%–17% of 2013 levels beyond the BAU case,
depending on the tax stringency and model. The median for the modest tax plus TCI is 6% and for the stringent tax
plus TCI is 9%, similar to the percentages in Breslow et al.
7
A significant reduction in electricity sector emissions could also be accomplished with a robust carbon price on
electricity sector emissions within the state and power imports. We have not analyzed that policy here.
8
In 2018, municipal electricity accounted for 14% of retail sales (EIA, 2019). If that percentage stays relatively
constant over the next decade, the CES will only apply to ~86% of electricity sales.
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Massachusetts could implement a standard of comparable stringency, following the model of
S.1958/H.2836, “An Act transitioning Massachusetts to 100% renewable energy,” which would similarly
decarbonize the electricity sector, including municipal plants, by 2035 (Bill S.1958, 2019). Other states in
the Northeast already have more stringent programs. For example, Maine’s RPS reaches 80% in 2030,
New York 70% in 2030 (100% in 2040), and Vermont 75% in 2032 (NCSL, 2020). These policies can be
combined with other measures like low-income housing efficiency upgrades to help protect vulnerable
households from any potential price increases.9

Figure 3: Emissions reductions by source in the stringent policy case. Red bars are emissions in a given year, and
green bars show reductions by policy 2017–2030. The CES is not part of S.2500 and would require additional
legislation. For simplicity, we assume that the strengthened CES would reach 100% in 2030. The value of carbon
tax reductions is the median from the EMF models; the full range overlaps with the 2030 goal. Net zero stretch code
estimate is only approximate.

Strengthening the CES would also pave the way for future emissions reductions. Decarbonization in the
other sectors mainly occurs through electrification, and it is most effective if the grid itself is fully
decarbonized. Transitioning space heating to electric heat pumps and replacing fossil-fuel powered
vehicles with EVs will increase demand for electricity, and both measures produce the largest air quality
and climate benefits with a fully decarbonized grid.
Because Massachusetts electricity emissions are also covered under RGGI, a policy concern could be that
a reduction in MA electricity emissions under a tighter CES/RPS would be offset by increases in other
9

The New England Clean Energy Connect, scheduled to come online in 2022, would provide Massachusetts with
9.45 TWh of hydropower from Quebec annually (~17% of annual state electricity consumption (EIA, 2019)). If
completed successfully, this project would also lower the cost of CES compliance and help prevent electricity price
increases (Hoagland and Dobbs, 2018).
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states, who could buy the cap and trade allowances Massachusetts would have used (the so-called
“waterbed effect”) (Burtraw and Keyes, 2018). However, RGGI allowances have traditionally traded at
or near the price floor (CRS, 2019) and the current COVID-19 crisis may create a further surplus. Under
these conditions, a tightened CES can be expected to have at least some effect on regional emissions.
Regardless, the current RGGI caps do not put the region on a trajectory for rapid decarbonization. An
aggressive CES in Massachusetts would come closer to representing the kinds of policies needed across
the region and would, on a state-level basis, reduce emissions.
All sectors need to be addressed to ensure continued reductions in emissions after 2030: As noted
above, the stringent policy case is sufficient to meet the 2030 goal, but even that scenario may leave
several areas of emissions under-addressed. Achieving net zero emissions by 2050 will require action in
these areas. Most importantly, Massachusetts will need to confront the transportation sector’s large share
of emissions. Even under the highest TCI cap reduction scenario, emissions in the transportation sector
would be about 23 MMT in 2030. To bring these emissions down by 2050, the state will need aggressive
policies to increase the prevalence of electric vehicles, improve public transport, and reduce vehicle miles
traveled through planning, funding, finance, and other measures. Building codes are also essential to
ensure that expensive retrofits are not required post-2030.
In addition, Massachusetts will need to address emissions of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide,
which we do not analyze here. These gases—which include methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorine
gases—accounted for an additional 6 MMT CO2e in 2017. Challenges reducing these emissions may
require even greater CO2 reduction efforts to hit the overall target.
Conclusions: This analysis is a rough attempt to understand the potential impact of carbon pricing and
other policies under S.2500. Predictions of the reductions in emissions from carbon pricing vary
significantly with few state-specific estimates available. As a result, policymakers and advocates should
not place too much weight on any specific numerical results. However, we can draw a number of
provisional conclusions based on our analysis:
● Massachusetts has already made significant headway in reducing carbon pollution, cutting CO2
emissions to 22% below 1990 levels in 2017.
● S.2500 would represent a huge step forward in emissions reductions, instituting a carbon price in
the transportation, residential, industrial, and commercial sectors and adopting important building
code provisions. This would put Massachusetts well ahead of states that have ambitious climate
goals but no significant policies to reach them.
● However, policymakers are likely to be disappointed if they expect to reach the 2030 goal (a 50%
reduction) with TCI, existing electricity sector policy, and carbon prices similar to H.2810 in the
remaining sectors.
● In particular, further emissions reductions from electricity are possible by 2030. For example,
Massachusetts could strengthen its CES or RPS standards.
● A robust carbon price in most sectors, combined with a more ambitious electricity sector policy,
would put MA well on track to a 50% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030.
● Other mixes of policies could also be combined to hit this target and position the state for the
deeper reductions needed to hit a longer-term (but rapidly approaching) net zero goal.
8
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Appendix A: Summary of Emissions by Sector
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection publishes yearly greenhouse gas inventory
data for the state (MassDEP, 2019). We included emissions from both in-state generation and imported
power in the electricity sector and placed municipal waste combustion in the industrial sector. Although
electricity is consumed by all the sectors, electricity-related emissions are only included in the power
sector to prevent double counting. Emissions from greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide are
covered by S.2500’s net zero goal but are not included in our analysis. These gases include methane (from
natural gas leaks, landfills, and wastewater), nitrous oxide (transportation, agriculture), and fluorine gases
(semiconductor manufacture and substitutes for ozone-depleting substances).
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Appendix B: Detailed Methods
Price trajectory: The implementation of carbon pricing would be the major source of emissions
reductions under S.2500. Since the bill does not specify a price trajectory, we used other recent bills to
determine a likely price. H.2810, “An Act to promote green infrastructure and reduce carbon emissions,”
was co-signed by over 100 Representatives and would set a tax that begins at $20/MT CO2e ($2019) and
rises $5 a year until it reaches $40. In subsequent years, it continues increasing only if the state is in
nonattainment of its emissions target (Bill H.2810, 2019). The green region on the graph below shows
this range of values.
In our analysis, we estimated the effect of a moderate tax resembling H.2810 with a $25 tax that rises 5%
a year ($2010) that is represented in EMF modeling. In 2019 dollars, that is $29/MT CO2 in 2020 and
$48/MT CO2 in
2030. This trajectory, which we used in the S.2500 proxy case, is shown in blue on the

graph. In the stringent policy case, we used the EMF scenario of a $50 tax rising at 5% a year ($2010). In
2019 dollars, this tax begins at $58/MT in 2020 and reaches $95 in 2030.

Applying EMF data to MA emissions: The EMF data contains projections from multiple economic
models run at the national (and sometimes regional) scale, helping to avoid bias specific to individual
models. Each carbon tax scenario also includes a variety of revenue neutral recycling methods. Because
the use of revenue does not significantly affect emissions reductions (Barron et al. 2018), we averaged
them together. Only three models ran scenarios specific to the Northeast (no models reported MA-specific
results). Since the regional results were not clearly different from the whole USA projections, we decided
to use data from both regions in order to include a wider range of models (for 7 models total). Applying
these national and regional level projections to a single state assumes that they will respond in a similar
fashion, which makes this an admittedly approximate exercise. National-level results would be clearly
inappropriate for the electricity sector, as Massachusetts has a significantly lower carbon intensity than
many parts of the country. For the other sectors, the use of fossil fuels and nature of the infrastructure is
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more broadly similar and can serve as a rough proxy in the absence of a detailed and current state-specific
model.
We calculated the percent change in emissions from 2015 to 2030 in each sector and model under the two
trajectories. Although the EMF carbon tax begins in 2020, we calculated the percent change from 2015,
because price anticipation causes significant emissions reductions before the tax is actually implemented
in some models. We recorded the maximum, median, and minimum response in each sector for both tax
scenarios and applied these percentages to 2015 Massachusetts emissions in the residential, commercial,
and industrial sectors to calculate projected 2030 emissions.
The graphs below show emission reductions from 2015–2030 for the models in the EMF dataset. The
reductions are shown as percentages of 2015 levels. Crossed-out points are outliers that were not included
in the analysis. The black crossbars show maximum, minimum, and median percent reduction in each
sector. Note that while electricity and transportation are shown on the graphs, we did not use the EMF
carbon tax data for these sectors in our analysis.

Reductions from 2015 to 2030 for models in the EMF dataset under the moderate carbon tax. Reductions
are shown as percentages of 2015 levels. The crossed out point is an outlier, possibly caused by a model
reporting error, that was excluded from our analysis. The black crossbars show maximum, minimum, and
median percent reduction in each sector.
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Reductions from 2015 to 2030 for models in the EMF dataset under the stringent carbon tax. Reductions
are shown as percentages of 2015 levels. The crossed out points are outliers, possibly caused by model
reporting errors, that were excluded from our analysis. The black crossbars show maximum, minimum,
and median percent reduction in each sector.
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Appendix C: Projected Results of TCI
TCI modeling: The chart below shows projected results of the TCI cap and invest program. For our
analysis, we assumed that Massachusetts would implement the 25% cap reduction case, which is the most
stringent option. As the table shows, the program would have significant public health benefits as well as
reducing emissions (TCI, 2019b).

Applying TCI data to Massachusetts: Massachusetts emissions data is available through 2017. Since
the TCI cap and invest program would not begin until 2022, we estimated MA transportation emissions in
2022 using the EIA’s 2020 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO). From 2017–2022, non-electricity
transportation emissions in the AEO New England reference case decreased by 5%. We assumed that TCI
emissions reductions occur linearly between 2022 and 2032, so that 80% of the reductions in a given case
occur by 2030. In the TCI reference case, emissions decrease by ~15% by 2030, and in the 25% cap
reduction case, emissions decrease by ~19% by 2030. We assumed that MA emissions scale with the
AEO and TCI regions, and applied these percent reductions to 2017 MA emissions in order to calculate
2030 emissions.
Comparing TCI with EMF modeling: Because Massachusetts has been a member of TCI since its
founding in 2010 and helped to develop the cap and invest proposal, the state would likely use TCI to
fulfill the requirement for a carbon price in the transportation sector (TCI, 2010; EEA, 2018). However,
S.2500 does not specify how the carbon price should be implemented, so MA could choose to implement
a tax instead. According to the EMF data, a moderate carbon tax would reduce transportation emissions to
22–30 MMT in 2030, with a median of 26 MMT. Under the stringent tax, model estimates span a similar
17

range from 21–29 MMT, with a median of 25 MMT. Emissions would be 23 MMT under the TCI 25%
cap reduction, which is at the lower end of the carbon tax range and is lower than both median values.
Given the attention to transportation specific issues in the TCI models and the investment features that
help reduce emissions, we place greater faith in the emissions reductions in the TCI modeling.
Appendix D: Stretch code estimation
As of November 2019, 278 municipalities containing 86% of the Massachusetts population had
implemented the current stretch building energy code (DOER, 2019). The stretch code applies to new
construction of residential buildings and commercial buildings over 100,000 square feet (GCD, 2017).
Because we were unable to find published estimates of the impacts of these standards but recognized their
importance for both short- and long-term reductions, we calculated a crude order-of-magnitude estimate.
According to building permit data from the UMass Donahue Institute, 14,300 new housing units were
constructed in stretch code communities in 2018 (UMass, 2019). The average annual non-electricity
emissions per New England housing unit are approximately 4.6 metric tons (EIA, 2018). To estimate
emission reductions by 2030, we assumed that the net zero code would be implemented in all the towns
with the current stretch code beginning in 2022. If construction continues at 2018 levels, there would be
approximately 130,000 net zero residential buildings by 2030. This translates to ~0.5 MMT CO2 fewer
emissions. No building permit data was available for commercial buildings, so this estimate includes
reductions from residential buildings only.
This calculation provides an order-of-magnitude estimate for the net zero code’s effects but contains
several approximations. The timing of stretch code implementation is uncertain and depends largely on
how the state incentivizes its adoption. The exact rate of new construction, especially post COVID-19, is
unknown. In addition, the net zero code removes emissions from new construction in towns that
implement the current stretch code, so using average emissions from buildings of all ages and locations
overestimates the code’s impact. On the other hand, the omission of the code’s coverage of large
commercial buildings underestimates the code’s impact. Finally, there is potentially overlap between the
reductions from a building code policy and carbon prices in the residential and commercial sectors. The
delay in the commercial and residential sector carbon prices in S.2500 (potentially until 2025 and 2030,
respectively) led us to err on the side of including the measure. A more detailed accounting would also
take building size and electricity emissions intensity into account. For the purposes of this analysis, these
results simply suggest that the reductions from building codes can be significant but not sufficient to close
the emissions gap to the broader policy goal.
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